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I. Introduction
The principal developments and trends to be noted in
the law of evidence appeared this year in appellate Court
decisions. The legislative changes were few. Only one legislative change seems likely to be of any significance and will
be felt primarily by drivers accused of being under the influence of intoxicating liquor. For lawyers, the notable developments appear in the case law; it is likely that the courts
will remain the primary arena for the development of the law
of evidence for some time to come.
II. Legislative Developments of 1969

A. The Informer Privilege
As originally enacted, Evidence Code section 1042 codified
the rule, previously declared by the courts, requiring a criminal prosecution to be dismissed if the name of an informer
who is a material witness on the issue of gUilt is concealed by
the government under the informer privilege contained in Evidence Code section 1041.1 With the exception hereinafter
noted, section 1042 also required the Court to suppress evidence, strike the testimony, or make some other appropriate
order if the government chose to invoke the informer privilege
to conceal the name of an informant who was a material witness, not as to guilt, but on some narrower issue such as the
admissibility of evidence. 2 Subdivision (c) of section 1042
provided an exception in narcotics cases permitting the government to conceal the name of a confidential informant who
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/5

1. Comment to Evid. Code
92

§

1042.

2. Comment to Evid. Code § 1042.
CAL LAW 1970

2

Harvey: Evidence

Evidence

was not a material witness on the issue of guilt, if the court
was satisfied that the informant was a reliable informant.
In 1969, the legislature broadened the exception contained
in subdivision (c) to apply in any criminal prosecution. At
the same time, subdivision (d) was added to deal with the
situation where the defendant contends that the confidential
informant is a material witness on the issue of guilt and the
prosecution contends that he is not. Subdivision (d) of section 1042, as added in 1969, provides that the Court may conduct a hearing out of the presence of the defendant and his
counsel at which the name of the informant can be revealed.
The purpose of this in camera hearing is to determine whether
nondisclosure will deprive the defendant of a fair trial. If the
court determines that nondisclosure will not deprive the defendant of a fair trial, the proceedings in camera remain
secret. If the court concludes that the defendant would be
deprived of a fair trial if the name of the witness is not revealed
to him, the Court then may proceed as authorized in subdivision (a) to make such order as may be required to assure a
fair trial to the defendant.
B. Subpoenas: Business Records, Witnesses

The 1969 session of the legislature also broadened the
scope of sections 1560-1566 of the Evidence Code. These
sections permitted a hospital records custodian, when responding to a subpoena duces tecum, to send the records with an
affidavit instead of appearing personally. As revised by the
legislature, these sections now grant the same privilege to the
custodian of any business record. The requisite affidavit must
show that the affiant is the custodian of the record, that the
forwarded record is that described in the subpoena, and that
such record was prepared in the ordinary course of business
at or near the time of the act, condition, or event reported in
the record. As under the previous version of the statute, the
personal attendance of the custodian of the record may be required by a statement on the subpoena duces tecum to that
effect. s
3. Evid. Code § 1564.
CAL LAW 1970
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A provision similarly designed to permit response to a subpoena with the least amount of inconvenience to the witness
involved was enacted as Code of Civil Procedure section
1985.1. Under this section, a witness subpoenaed by a party
need not appear at the time and place specified in the subpoena if he agrees with the party at whose request the subpoena was issued to appear at another time or upon such notice as may be specified by their agreement. Under this
section, failure to appear in accordance with the agreement
is punishable as a contempt.
C. Presumptions: Blood Alcohol

Since the Evidence Code created the prevailing system
under which some presumptions affect the burden of proof
and others affect the burden of producing evidence, the legislature has from time to time enacted legislation classifying
presumptions for the purpose of allocating the burden of proof
or of producing evidence. Probably the most significant of
these enactments is that contained in section 23126 of the
Vehicle Code, which was added in 1969. Under this section
several presumptions affecting the burden of proof were
created. In a criminal prosecution arising out of acts alleged
to have been committed by any person while driving a vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, there is now
a presumption affecting the burden of proof that if the person
has less than .05 % by weight of alcohol in his blood at the
time of the test, he was not under the influence of alcohol
at the time of the alleged offense. If the percentage of blood
alcohol is .05 % or more, but less than .10%, there is no
presumption as to the influence of the intoxicating liquor. If
the person is found to have .10% or more of alcohol in
his blood, it is presumed that he was under the influence of
intoxicating liquor.
The effect of these provisions is to be determined by sections 600-607 of the Evidence Code, which describe the effect
of presumptions. Applying the Evidence Code to those provisions of Vehicle Code section 23126 relating to the effect
of a finding of a blood-alcohol percentage of .10 or less, it
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/5
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appears that they are without significance. Since, in a prosecution for drunk driving, the prosecution has the burden of proving that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, a statute imposing such burden on the prosecution
after proof that the defendant had a blood-alcohol percentage
of .05 or less adds nothing to the burden of proof that was
already imposed on the prosecution. And since prior to the
enactment of the statute, there was no presumptive effect to a
finding of any particular percentage of blood alcohol, it is obvious that the provision that there is no presumptive effect to
a finding of blood alcohol between .05 and .10 percent does
not change the law.
The significant provision of new Vehicle Code section
23126 is the one that creates a presumption that a person
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor when it is proved
that his blood contained .10% or more by weight of alcohol.
Under this provision, the prosecution need prove on the issue
of "under the influence" only that the defendant had the requisite blood-alcohol percentage. It will no longer be necessary under the statute to prove the actual influence that the
alcohol had on his behavior. On proof of the requisite bloodalcohol percentage, the defendant will be required to show
that he was not under the influence of alcohol. Since the
presumption is applicable in criminal actions only, under
Evidence Code section 607, the defendant's burden of proof
requires only that the defendant raise a reasonable doubt as
to whether he was under the influence of alcohol. In substantive effect, the legislature by enacting Vehicle Code section 23126 has provided that it is unlawful to drive with a
blood-alcohol percentage of .10 percent or more unless the
defendant can raise a doubt in the mind of the trier of fact as
to whether such alcohol influenced him in his driving.
It should be noted that the statute as drafted creates a presumption as to the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time
of the alleged offense from proof of blood-alcohol percentage
at the time of the chemical test. The statute does not require
that the test be given within a prescribed period of time after
the alleged offense and it does not require proof that the deCAL LAW 1970
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fendant had no access to alcohol between the time of the
offense and the time of the test.
These omissions could affect the constitutionality of the
statute. It has been repeatedly held that a presumption is
unconstitutional if there is no rational connection between the
fact proved and the fact presumed. 3.5 There is obviously no
rational connection between a blood-alcohol percentage at
the time of the chemical test and the influence of alcohol at
the time of an offense unless the test is given within a few hours
after the offense and the offender had no opportunity to ingest
alcohol in the interim. Yet these essential foundational conditions are not required to be shown by the statute in order
to establish the presumption. The presumption arises from
the blood alcohol level at the time of the test alone.
The constitutional question could have been readily avoided
if the legislature had simply based the presumption on the
blood alcohol level at the time of the alleged offense. Since
alcohol disappears from the blood at a constant rate, proof
of the blood-alcohol percentage at the time of the offense
could be provided by evidence of the chemical test, the time
elapsed between the offense and the test, and the absence of
opportunity to ingest alcohol in the interim. It is, therefore,
somewhat surprising that the statute was drafted in the form
it now appears. After all, the element of the crime involved
is being under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time
of the offense, not being under the influence at the time of
submission to a chemical test.
III. Judicial Developments of 1969

As in former years, the courts have continued to develop
rules of evidence based on procedural guarantees of the United
States Constitution. Again, the bulk of the appellate cases
dealing with evidence are criminal cases. The most significant
event in the period of time covered by this report is the discovery by the courts of certain new limitations that the Sixth
3.5. People v Stevenson 58 Cal. 2d
594, 26 Cal. Rptr. 297, 376 P.2d 297
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Amendment requirement of confrontation imposes on the
admissibility of hearsay evidence. There have been suggestions that the Sixth Amendment now prohibits rational
development of the hearsay rule and may in fact require reevaluation of some exceptions heretofore accepted without
substantial question. Since this development, along with the
trend it may foreshadow, is by far the most significant event
of 1969 so far as the law of evidence is concerned, this report
first turns to those cases dealing with the constitutional right
of confrontation, the hearsay rule, and the relationship between the two.
A. Confrontation and Hearsay:
ment

Witness' Prior State-

The leading case is People v. Johnson,4 decided in 1968.
In the Johnson case, the defendant's wife and daughter had
testified before a grand jury that the defendant had committed
acts of incest with the daughter. On the basis of this testimony, the defendant was indicted. He pleaded guilty, and
after serving some two years and 8 months in prison, his plea
was set aside by order of a federal court for lack of adequate
representation by counsel. On rearraignment, the defendant
pleaded not guilty and was tried. At the trial, the wife and
daughter denied that the incestuous acts had occurred. The
grand jury testimony was then introduced, and under Evidence Code section 1235, it was received for the truth of
the matters stated. The California Supreme Court held that
this use of the prior inconsistent statements was impermissible
under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guaranteeing the right to confrontation in criminal cases.
In Johnson, of course, the defendant did confront the witnesses whose statements were introduced against him, and he
did have the right to cross-examine them before the trier of
fact concerning the subject matter of their statements. Nevertheless, the Court held that the use of their prior statements
to prove the matters stated violated the constitutional right of
4. 68 Cal.2d 646, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599,
441 P.2d III (1968), cert. den., 393
CAL LAW 1970
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confrontation. Said the Court, that right requires the right of
cross-examination at the time the statements are given. 5
In 1969, further ramifications of the Johnson decision have
developed, but the full potential of that decision has yet to
be realized.
In Johnson itself, there was no indication that the statements involved would have been admissible if the declarants
had been unavailable to testify at the time of the trial. Subsequent cases, however, have indicated that the admissibility
of the statements in the absence of the declarants is not a
relevant consideration in determining whether the statements
can be admitted as substantive evidence. Thus, in People v.
Green6 the Supreme Court held that the Johnson rule is equally
applicable to inconsistent statements made at a preliminary
hearing. Thus, the fact that the defendant confronted the
declarant and had the right to cross-examine both at the preliminary hearing and at the trial itself was not deemed to be
an adequate vindication of the right of confrontation.
Peculiarly, the Courts have continued to hold that former
testimony is admissible as substantive evidence if the declarant
is unavailable as a witness at the time of trial. 7 "Peculiarly"
is used to characterize these holdings because it is apparent
that the declarant is not subject to cross-examination before
the trier of fact. Indeed, it is a condition of admissibility
that the witness be "unavailable."
Under Green, therefore, a witness' former testimony may
not be admitted as substantive evidence if the witness is
available and subject to cross-examination. However, the
evidence can come in if the witness is unavailable-all in the
name of protecting the defendants' right to cross-examine.
In Green, the conviction was reversed because the witness was
available at trial and subject to cross-examination. Had the

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/5
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6. 70 Cal.2d 654, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782,
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witness been unavailable for cross-examination at trial, the
preliminary hearing testimony would have supported the conviction.
An attempt to justify this anomalous result appears in
People v. Vinson. s In Vinson, the Court was also concerned
with the admissibility of prior testimony. In accordance with
Green, Vinson holds that prior testimony is not admissible
as substantive evidence when the witness is present and subject to cross-examination, even though the prior testimony
would have been admissible as substantive evidence if the
witness were unavailable at trial. Said the Court,
It is one thing to use prior testimony . . . when the
witness is dead, incompetent or out of the jurisdiction.
It is an entirely different matter to use such testimony
as substantive evidence when the witness is in court and
able to testify before the very forum that is going to pass
judgment on a defendant who is on trial for his life or
freedom. In the former situation, the hearsay is reasonably reliable and is presumably presented to the jury
in good faith since it is the only evidence available. In
the latter situation, the hearsay is no longer reliable, and
it is not the only evidence available.
This is obvious nonsense. Former testimony is former
testimony. Whether it is reliable or not has nothing to do
with whether the witness is now available or unavailable.
That a witness has disappeared obviously does not breathe
additional credibility into his former testimony. One would
think that if it is constitutionally permissible to introduce as
substantive evidence a statement of a person who cannot be
cross-examined before the trier of fact (as in the case of any
hearsay exception dependent on unavailability), it ought to
be equally constitutionally permissible to introduce the same
statement with the same effect when the declarant is before
the trier of fact and subject to cross-examination. After
all, it is the right to cross-examine the witness before the trier
of fact that we are trying to protect.
8. 268 Cal. App.2d 672, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 340 (1969).
CAL LAW 1970
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In applying the Johnson rule to hearsay evidence that
would have been admissible if the declarant were unavailable,
the courts have failed to discern the basic scheme of the Evidence Code in establishing the "unavailability" condition. If
one will scan the exceptions to the hearsay rule in the Evidence
Code, he will discover that the condition of "unavailability"
appears in various hearsay exceptions where the declaration
involved is a narrative of past events.10 In most instances,
however, the statement is made under circumstances assuring
sufficient trustworthiness that it may be admitted even though
the declarant is not subject to cross-examination at trial. The
presence of the declarant at trial does not make his former
statement less trustworthy, and in fact his presence at trial
should enhance the ability of the trier of fact to determine
the truth or falsity of his former statement. Why, then, is the
"unavailability" condition imposed on hearsay statements that
we would be willing to receive if there were no confrontation
at trial?
In these situations, the condition of "unavailability" expresses a preference for the viva voce narration of the witness
before the present trier of fact over a previous narration of the ,
same event. The condition of unavailability requires the proponent of the statement to call the witness if he is available,
instead of relying on his hearsay narration. This, in substance, is the significance of the Comment to Evidence Code
section 1230, explaining the addition of the "unavailability"
condition to the exception for declarations against interest.
It was not the intent of the drafters of the code that such
statements should be inadmissible as substantive evidence
when the witness is produced. Obviously, a declaration
against interest is no less trustworthy when the witness is at
the trial than it is when the witness is not. Former testimony
is no less trustworthy when the witness is at the trial than it
was when the witness could not be produced. But in each
of these cases, the "unavailability" requirement forces the pro-

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/5
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ponent to produce the witness, and the former statement is
then available (with just as much reliability as it otherwise
had) to present to the trier of fact if the witness in his viva
voce testimony contradicts his prior statement.
Professor McCormickl l has stated the rationale underlying
the confrontation rule as follows:
The production of the prosecution's witnesses at the
final trial is important to the accused in three ways. First,
in the light of the common law tradition, it affords an
opportunity for cross examination. Second, it enables
the accused to look the prisoner in the eye, which was
once supposed to, and perhaps does, make a false accusation more difficult. Third, the judge or jury will see the
demeanor of the witness on the stand and thus be enabled
better to weigh his credibility.
Thus, the requirement of confrontation enables the trier of
fact to better evaluate the truth of the statements being introduced against the defendant. The rule of confrontation enhances the ability of the trier of fact to determine such truth by
requiring that the declarant appear before the trier of fact and
there face cross-examination by the defendant. Under exceptions to the hearsay rule, we are willing to forgo this protection
to the accused, and to permit certain statements to be admitted
against him for the truth of their content, even though the
accused will have no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant before the trier of fact. Under one of these exceptions
(former testimony), the accused at least had a right to crossexamine on a previous occasion, but under most of them
he gets no opportunity to cross-examine at all. It should
be obvious that the ability of the trier of fact to evaluate
the truth or falsity of these statements is enhanced, not
diminished, by the appearance of the declarant at the trial and
his cross-examination concerning the subject matter of the
statements. Since the declarant is before the court, the accused can look the declarant in the eye, and the trier of fact
11. McCormick, Evidence, p. 484
(1954).
CAL LAW 1970
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can see the demeanor of the witness on the stand. Most important, both parties have an opportunity to examine and
cross-examine the witness. It seems difficult to believe, therefore, that the constitutional right of confrontation, which was
designed to protect the right of cross-examination, excludes
statements as substantive evidence when the witness is subject
to cross-examination, but permits the statements to be used as
substantive evidence when the witness is not subject to crossexamination.
In Johnson and Green, the Supreme Court declared that
the constitutional right of confrontation requires contemporaneous cross-examination, that is, cross-examination at
the time the statements are made before the trier of fact that
must determine the truth or falsity of the statements. This is
a newly declared principle, and at least one court has indicated
substantial doubt that it is required by the Constitution. In
People v. Pierce 12 the court said:
The Sixth Amendment right of confrontation assures
the accused an opportunity to probe the witness' accuracy. At this point the needs of effective prosecution
parallel and do not collide with the interest protected by
the Sixth Amendment, for the prosecution too, needs an
effective forensic scalpel. The question is: On which
occasion was the witness speaking the truth: when he
made his prior statement or when he gave his courtroom
testimony?
A powerful male family figure frequently appears as
the accused in intra-family sex cases. The dominance
by which he imposes his sexual desires on the weaker
members also permits him to close their mouths. The
pressure he uses to silence the witnesses against him are
fear, female sentiment and economic need. After the
offense breaks out into open crisis he needs time to restore his dominance. The family's initial outburst of
complaint is more likely to be reliable, their later testimony apt to be subverted by time and pressure. The

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/5

12. 269 Cal. App.2d 193, 202-203,
75 Cal. Rptr. 257, 264 (1969).
102

CAL LAW 1970

12

Harvey: Evidence

Evidence

turncoat witness is a standard syndrome of family sex
offenses, one which baffles law officers and prosecutors.
By rejecting present cross examination as a means of
forcing the witness to explain his past declarations and
his present testimony, the Johnson rule enlarges on the
Sixth Amendment, frustrates the prosecution's ability to
cope with turncoat witnesses and prevents the jury from
considering evidence of probative value and probable
reliability.
The Pierce assessment of the Johnson-Green rule as an enlargement of the Sixth Amendment seems accurate. Although
the California Supreme Court cited a number of United States
Supreme Court cases holding that a prior right to cross-examine does not satisfy the defendant's right of confrontation at
trial, no case was cited (there are none) holding the right
of confrontation is violated when cross-examination at trial
is permitted.
The Pierce opinion also points out that the Johnson-Green
rule forces the use of limiting instructions that require a jury
to consider evidence for one purpose and shun it for another.
As pointed out in Pierce, and as suggested by the Supreme
Court in People v. Aranda,13 few people really believe that the
jury can intelligently apply such limiting instructions.
Of more concern is the question of where the doctrine of
"contemporaneous cross-examination" will lead. In Green,
it led to a holding that former testimony cannot be used as
substantive evidence where the witness testifies at the trial
and has, thus, been subjected to the defendant's cross-examination on the statements twice. What, then, of recorded memory? The recorded memory ~xception is contained in section
1237 of the Evidence Code. Under this exception, as traditionally recognized, a trial witness can testify that he correctly
recorded some event that he does not remember, whereupon the
authenticated record of his memory is admissible to prove the
13. 63 Cal.2d 518, 529, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 353, 359-360, 407 P.2d 265, 271272 (1965).
CAL LAW 1970
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truth of its content. Since the memory is typically recorded
out of court, there is obviously no opportunity to cross-examine at the time the original statement is made. It is true
that there is an opportunity to cross-examine at the trial,
but cross-examination at the trial is not contemporaneous
with the statement that is being offered. Applied consistently, the Johnson-Green principle of contemporaneous
cross-examination should require the exclusion of recorded
memory. Indeed, since the witness does not remember the
event recorded, cross-examination at the trial is largely fruitless. It is at least less efficacious and truth-revealing than
cross-examination concerning a prior statement where the
witness remembers the event. In the latter situation, the jury
can observe the witness' demeanor as he explains his present
and previous stories and relates what he now declares is the
truth concerning the event. Where recorded memory is concerned, however, the jury never has an opportunity to observe
the witness' demeanor as he relates the crucial events because,
as a condition of admissibility, he does not remember
them.
It was argued in People v. Gentryl4 that recorded memory
is inadmissible under the Johnson rationale. Gentry held,
however, that a right of confrontation does not prohibit the
use of recorded memory in a criminal prosecution. The Court
explained that the Johnson rule is properly limited to impeaching statements. The Court held that the Johnson rule should
not be applied to consistent statements where the witness now
vouches for the accuracy of the prior statement.
Forgetting for the moment that the witness in Johnson
could be cross-examined concerning the events in question
(because he remembered them), while the witness in Gentry
could not be cross-examined concerning the events in question
(because he did not remember them), the Gentry explanation
is nevertheless inconsistent with the later ruling of the Supreme
Court in People v. Washington. l5 There, the California Supreme Court held that section 1236 of the Evidence Code
14. 270 Cal. App.2d 462, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 336 (1969).
104
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cannot be applied constitutionally in a criminal case to permit
a prior consistent statement to be admitted as substantive evidence.
The only distinction to be perceived between Washington
and Gentry is that the witness in Washington remembered
the event in question and was, hence, subject to effective crossexamination at the trial, while the witness in Gentry did not
remember the event in question and was not, therefore, subject
to effective cross-examination. Yet, the decisions so far suggest that the recorded memory exception applied in Gentry is
constitutional, while the consistent statement exception in
Washington is unconstitutional because of the lack of contemporaneous cross-examination at the time of the making of
the prior statement. The inconsistency in the rules is obvious, and it is impossible to predict at the present time where
the "contemporaneous cross-examination" rule will lead insofar as recorded memory is concerned.
The exception for coconspirators' statements contained in
Evidence Code section 1223 may also be in jeopardy under
the Johnson rule. Since typically the coconspirator's statement (made in the course and scope of the conspiracy) is
made out of court, it is obvious that there is no opportunity for
cross-examination at the time the statement is made. Moreover, there is typically no opportunity for "contemporaneous
cross-examination" at the trial, for the usual coconspirator
cannot be forced to testify because of his privilege against
self-incrimination. With no opportunity to cross-examine at
either the time of the statement or the time of the trial, it may
be that the Johnson rationale will forbid the use of coconspirators' statements as hearsay evidence in criminal prosecutions.
Indeed, since all the exceptions for vicarious admissions are
based on a rationale other than the trustworthiness of the
statements/ 6 it may be that no vicarious admissions may be
used in a criminal prosecution because of the lack of the
16. See Comment to Evid. Code
§ 403.
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opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination before
the trier of fact.
Although the objection that hearsay is not subject to "contemporaneous cross-examination" before the ultimate trier
of fact is applicable to all hearsay exceptions, it seems unlikely
that the Johnson principle may jeopardize any other hearsay
exceptions. The remaining hearsay exceptions are based on
some circumstantial probability of trustworthiness, such as
the fact that the statements were made without time for reflection, or business, commercial, or governmental activities have
been based on the statements, or the statements have been
relied on as true by parties concerned with them for long periods of time.
Vicarious admissions, however, are not admitted on the
theory that they are trustworthy. The trustworthiness of recorded memory rests only in the say-so of a witness at the trial
who does not remember the event. It is unlikely that former
testimony is admitted because it is trustworthy. Testimony
given at a trial between different parties is not admissible
even though it is as trustworthy as testimony admitted under
the former testimony exception. Hence, it seems more likely
that former testimony is admitted under Evidence Code section 1291, simply because the defendant has already had a
chance to cross-examine and, inasmuch as we cannot give him
cross-examination at the trial because the witness is unavailable, the former cross-examination must suffice. Even though
the former testimony may be unreliable-as, for example, if
it was obtained from a convicted perjurer or from a witness
who later contradicted himself-the evidence remains admissible but subject to impeachment under Evidence Code section
1202. Since the admissibility of vicarious admissions, former
testimony, and recorded memory is not based on any unique
trustworthiness to be attributed to the statements, the Johnson rationale could be carried far enough to prohibit the admission of such statements.
This writer doubts that the Johnson principle will be carried
further. Already there are indications in the cases that there
may be some reconsideration of the strength of the rule.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/5

106

CA L. L.A W 1970

16

Harvey: Evidence

Evidence

In In re Hill/7 the Court held that it was error to admit the
confession of a codefendant at the defendant's trial because
of the lack of opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine
the codefendant before the trier of fact at the time the confession was made. To admit the confession would violate the
defendant's right of confrontation. The defendant's right of
confrontation was violated, said the Court, even though the
confessing codefendant took the stand and was subject to
cross-examination. Nevertheless, the error was held to be
nonprejudicial because the defendant was able to crossexamine the confessing codefendant at the trial on the subject
matter of the confession. The Court stated:
:>
The constitutional infirmity created by the lack of crossexamination of Madorid at the time he made his confession was thus rendered harmless by petitioners' opportunity to cross-examine him at trial with respect to his
testimony consistent with his confession. 1s
A similar result was reached in People v. Washington/ 9
where a prior consistent statement was admitted for the truth
of its content. The Court held that this was an error of constitutional dimension because of the lack of opportunity for
the defendant to conduct a contemporaneous cross-examination before the ultimate trier of fact. Nevertheless this error
was also held to be nonprejudicial because the defendant did
have the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at the
trial. Said the Court:
The prior extrajudicial statements of the witnesses were
in form and substance substantially identical with the
in-court testimony of the witnesses at the trial. The jury
was obviously free to give the in-court testimony full
substantive use if they believed it and defendant's conviction indicates that they did. Since the hearsay statements were identical with the courtroom testimony, the
17. 71
458 P.2d
18. 71
537, 545,

Cal.2d - , 80 Cal. Rptr. 537,
449 (1969).
Cal.2d - , - , 80 Cal. Rptr.
458 P.2d 449, 457.
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jury could not have logically believed the former and
disbelieved the latter. In short, the only value of the
prior statements lay in the mere repetition of what had
been said on direct examination. There was thus no
'reasonable possibility'
that the constitu·
tional error contributed to defendant's conviction.2il
The significance of these two decisions rests on the fact
that the findings of "nonprejudice" are based on the same
reasoning underlying the admissibility of a witness' prior statements under sections 1235, 1236, 1237, and 1238 of the Evidence Code. The real question in every case is whether a defendant is prejudiced by the introduction of an out-of-court
statement when the witness is present in court and testifies
in regard to the subject matter of the statement, and the
defendant has a full opportunity to cross-examine concerning
the statement. Hill and Washington suggest that the admission of out-of-court statements under such circumstances is
nonprejudicial. It is but a small extension of these cases to state
that the statements are admissible, that is, that adequate attrial cross-examination satisfies the constitutional guarantee
of confrontation.
Accordingly, it may be that the exception for recorded
memory and the exceptions for vicarious admissions may be
saved from the Johnson principle. It is difficult to see, however, how in logic the exception for recorded memory can remain immune from the Johnson rule so long as the Court
continues to apply it with full vigor to former statements
of a trial witness who is subject to full cross-examination at
trial. It is to be hoped that the Court will at least modify
the rule so that the "unavailability" condition will not operate
to exclude prior statements by the trial witnesses, a function it
was not intended to serve, but will rather operate as a sort
of best evidence rule, compelling the proponent to produce
testimony instead of hearsay, but leaving him free to introduce
the prior statement if, despite the testimony, such evidence is
20. 71 Ca1.2d - , - , 80 Cal. Rptr.
567, 576, 458 P.2d 479, 488.
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needed and it meets all other conditions of an exception to the
hearsay rule.
B. Hearsay: Former Testimony

The 1969 cases continue to emphasize that the unavailabil.
ity of a witness to testify at a trial must be genuine before
former testimony can be introduced. Thus, in People v.
Baileyl it was held to be error to admit the preliminary hearing
testimony of an out-of-state witness when the prosecution
made no showing of any effort to persuade the witness to return to California, or of any effort to procure the witness' pres·
ence by the procedure allowed under the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in
Criminal Proceedings. 2
In People v. Tedd 3 the preliminary hearing testimony of a
witness was held to be inadmissible where the prosecution
showed some effort to find him within the state but such effort
was so little and so late that the court concluded that it did
not amount to "reasonable diligence." The investigators had
failed to follow up on a number of good leads that they had
discovered while looking for the witness.
In People v. Billon,4 by resort to the judicial notice doctrine,
the prosecution sought to avoid the application of the "unavailability" condition to the admissibility of former testimony. The charge against Billon was possession of a firearm
by a felon convicted of a prior offense involving the use of a
firearm. At trial, the prosecutor presented a certified copy of
the defendant's 1963 conviction of assault with a deadly
weapon, but produced no evidence whatever to show that this
offense involved the use of a firearm. To overcome the deficiency in proof, the Attorney General asked the reviewing
court to take judicial notice of the transcript of the preliminary
1. 273 Cal. App.2d - , 78 Cal. Rptr.
107 (1969).
2. See also People v. Nieto, 268 Cal.
App.2d 231, 76 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1968),
holding that Evid. Code § 240, requires
the prosecution to resort to the Uniform Act in order to show reasonable
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4. 266 Cal. App.2d 537, 72 Cal.
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hearing relating to the 1963 conviction. The Court refused
to do so, stating that to do so would amount to a deprivation
of the defendant's right to a jury trial. In essence, the prosecution was attempting to supply proof of the missing element
(the use of a firearm) by testimony given at the 1963 preliminary hearing without proving the unavailability of the
witness. Although the Court did not pinpoint the basis for its
objection to this procedure, its conclusion was necessary to
preserve the conditions required by Evidence Code section
1291, for the admissibility of former testimony.

C. Privileges: Self-Incrimination
The year 1969 was a significant year for California motorists. As noted above, the legislature enacted a series of presumptions relating to blood-alcohol percentages for use in
prosecutions for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The California Supreme Court also contributed a
significant addition to the law of evidence relating to motorists.
In Byers v. Justice Coud the Court considered the relationship between the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination and the Vehicle Code sections requiring a motorist involved in an accident to stop and give his name. Byers
had been involved in an accident, but he had failed to stop
and identify himself. Accordingly, he was eventually charged
with hit-and-run driving. Byers contended that he could not
be prosecuted for failing to stop and identify himself, for his
privilege against self-incrimination entitled him to refuse to do
so. The Supreme Court agreed with Byers that a requirement
that he stop and identify himself, when such information might
lead to a criminal charge against him, would violate his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore,
to accommodate the Fifth Amendment and the policies of the
statutes requiring identification, the Court judicially created
an immunity for any driver who complies with the Vehicle
Code sections by stopping and identifying himself. The Court
said such identification evidence may not be used against
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the driver in any subsequent criminal prosecution. Since
Byers himself could not have anticipated that he would be
granted an immunity from prosecution if he had stopped, the
prosecution against Byers was barred. Hereafter, therefore, a
driver involved in an accident must stop and identify himself,
but the prosecution must use other sources of information to
identify the driver if it wishes to charge him with any crime
arising from the accident.
In a comprehensive opinion relating to police interrogation,
the Court in People v. Isbl set forth the distinctions between
a defendant's rights under Massiah v. United States7 and
Miranda v. Arizona. s The Court pointed out that Miranda
permits a custodial interrogation of an accused, without the
presence of counsel, where proper advice has been given
the accused concerning his rights, and the accused knowingly
and intelligently waives his right to be represented by counsel
and agrees to answer the questions or make a statement. Massiah, however, defines the rights of an accused who has been
formally arraigned and is represented by counsel, whether
voluntarily chosen or appointed. Under Massiah, no interrogation designed to elicit incriminating statements can take
place in the absence of the defendant's counsel. Applying
this distinction to the facts involved in People v. Isby, the
Court concluded that the incriminatory statements elicited
from Isby during interrogation after the appointment of
counsel were inadmissible. It did not matter that the defendant had been given the Miranda advice and warnings and had
thereafter consented to the interrogation. Following the appointment or procurement of counsel, said the Court, any interrogation in the absence of that counsel is constitutionally
impermissible under the standards set forth in Massiah.
There continue to be cases involving application of
Miranda standards and repeated attempts by defense counsel
to apply those standards to nontestimonial evidence obtained
6. 267 Cal. App.2d 484, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 294 (1968).
7. 377 U.S. 201, 12 L.Ed.2d 246, 84
S.Ct. 1199 (1964).
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from the defendant. So far, such efforts have proved fruitless.
Thus, in People v. Walker,9 the Court held that Miranda
does not require that a suspect be informed that his refusal to
submit to a blood test may be used against him. Moreover,
there is no requirement that the defendant be provided with
counselor an opportunity to obtain counsel before the administration of a blood-alcohol or other sobriety test.
In Rust v. Department of Motor Vehicles 10 it was successfully contended that an officer who stopped a motorist suspected of driving while intoxicated confused the driver with the
Miranda warning. The Court held that the warning given
the motorist did not make sufficiently clear that the motorist's
right to an attorney was a right to have the attorney present
only during questioning, not during the administration of
sobriety tests. Since the officer did not qualify his warning to
the motorist concerning the right to counsel, the Court held
that the motorist's refusal to submit to a test in the absence of
counsel was not a violation of the Vehicle Code requirement
that motorists submit to such tests. Later efforts by motorists
to claim confusion on the basis of the Miranda warning have
not proved as successful as the claim made in Rust. n
In People v. Stroud12 the Court discussed the burden of
proof that must be met by the prosecution to satisfy a judge as
to the admissibility of a confession. The Evidence Code is
silent on the question, and there was no case authority in
California to guide the Court. The Court concluded that
the prosecution must establish the conditions for the admissibility of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial
judge has a reasonable doubt concerning the admissibility of
a confession, he should exclude the statement.
D. Privileges: Husband and Wife
Under former law, a married person could not testify for or
against the other spouse without the consent of both. Under
9. 266
Rptr. 224
10. 267
Rptr. 366
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(1968).
Cal. App.2d 545, 73 Cal.
(1969).

11. See Lacy v. Orr, 276 Cal. App.
2d -, 81 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1969).
12. 273 Cal. App.2d - , 78 Cal.
Rptr. 270 (1969).
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Evidence Code section 970, the privilege is taken away from
the party-spouse and given to the witness-spouse. The privilege is also restricted to a privilege not to testify against the
other spouse. I3 In People v. Bradford,14 the Supreme Court
held that the application of Evidence Code section 970, in a
trial for a crime committed before the effective date of the
Evidence Code, was not the application of an ex post facto
law.
Bradford is of somewhat transitory significance, for there
will be few crimes committed before the effective date of the
Code that come to trial hereafter. A ramification of the shift
of the privilege that is of more permanent significance was
pointed out by the Court in People v. Coleman. Ia The prosecuting attorney in Coleman commented on the failure of the
defendant's wife to testify in his behalf. The defendant asserted that this was error, citing People v. Wilkes,I6 which was
decided before the enactment of the Evidence Code. The Supreme Court recognized that, prior to the enactment of the
Code, it was improper to comment on the failure of the defendant's spouse to testify.
Because, under former law, the privilege was that of both
spouses, the party-spouse could not compel the witness-spouse
to testify for or against him. Under the Evidence Code,
a spouse has no privilege not to testify for the other spouse.
Therefore, said the Court:
Comment on a wife's failure to testify for her defendant. constitute comment on the
husband does not.
exercise of a privilege that defendant has . . . or on
his failure to call a witness that he cannot compel to testify on his behalf. Since defendant's failure to call his
wife was a failure to call a material and important witness, his not doing so could be considered by the jury
and commented upon by the prosecuting attorney.17
13. See People v. Bradford 70 Cal.
2d 333, 74 Cal. Rptr. 726, 450 P2d 46
(1969).
14. 70 Cal.2d 333, 74 Cal. Rptr. 726,
450 P.2d 46.
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920, 925, 459 P.2d 248, 253 (1969).
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Thus, under Coleman, a prosecutor may comment on a
defendant's failure to produce a spouse as a witness whenever
it appears that the spouse has knowledge of facts material to
the prosecution.

E. Opinion Testimony
Several appellate decisions during 1969 involved the propriety of, and limitations on, opinion expert testimony. In
People v. Zismer,18 the Court held that a footprint cannot be
introduced in evidence without opinion testimony connecting the footprint with the foot of the defendant. There must
be some foundational opinion evidence pointing out the similarity in the prints. The Court rejected the suggestion that
the jury can evaluate the alleged similarity of prints for itself.
In State of California ex rei. Department of Public Works
v. Wherity,19 the Court held that it was error for the trial
court, in a condemnation proceeding, to exclude the testimony of an expert as to the highest and best use of the property in question. The expert was offered for the purpose
of testifying on highest and best use only, not the value of
the property.
In People v. King,20 the Court rejected an expert's opinion
identifying the defendant by a voiceprint. The Court held
that voiceprint identification is not sufficiently developed
to permit opinions based thereon to be admitted in court.

F. Search and Seizure
The major development in the law of search and seizure
during 1969 was the rule announced by the United States
Supreme Court in Chimel v. California. 1 Chimel was arrested
in his home pursuant to a warrant. After serving the warrant,
the officers asked for permission to look around, and when
Chimel objected he was advised that on the basis of the arrest
the officers would conduct the search anyway. The officers
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20. 266 Cal. App.2d 437, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 478 (1968).
1. 395 U.S. 752, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 89
S.Ct. 2034 (1969).
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searched the house for about an hour and seized certain evidence that was later used against Chimel in a burglary prosecution. The United States Supreme Court held that a search
incident to a valid arrest must be limited to a search of the
person arrested. The purpose of the search must be to remove
any weapons that might be used to resist arrest or effect an escape, and must be limited to the area into which the arrestee
might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items.
The search, therefore, must be confined to the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control. If the search
is to go further, the officers must obtain a search warrant.
The arrest itself will not justify a search of the entire residence
in which the arrest is made.

G. Writings To Refresh Recollection
Evidence Code section 771, provides that if a witness uses
a writing to refresh his memory with respect to any matter
about which he testifies, the writing must be produced at the
request of an adverse party and, unless the writing is so produced, the testimony of the witness shall be stricken. Under
this section, it does not matter whether the refreshing of the
recollection was done at the hearing or prior thereto. Under
subdivision (c) of section 771, production of the writing is
excused if the writing is not in the possession or control of the
witness or the party who produced his testimony and was not
reasonably procurable by such party.
In Kerns Construction Co. v. Superior Courf the deposition of an employee of a party was taken by an adverse party.
During the taking of the deposition, the employee refreshed
his recollection by referring to reports that he had prepared
in connection with his investigation of the accident that gave
rise to the lawsuit. The party taking the deposition demanded
the production of the reports. The employer from whom
they were demanded asserted that the reports were privileged.
The Court overruled this contention and held that the party
taking the deposition was entitled to compel production of the
2. 266 Cal. App.2d 405, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 74 (1968).
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reports. The Court held that the reports were privileged
under the attorney-client privilege, but when the employer
furnished the reports to the employee for the purpose of
refreshing his recollection, the privilege was waived. Although the adverse party took the deposition and thus compelled the employee to testify, the employer was under no
obligation to provide the reports to the employee for purposes
of his testimony. Having done so voluntarily, it waived its
privilege and the adverse party could compel production of the
reports used to refresh recollection.
IV. Conclusion

The movement for evidence reform that resulted in the enactment of the Evidence Code began because there was almost
uniform dissatisfaction with the state of the existing law. So
far as hearsay is concerned, conditions of admissibility varied
from exception to exception without apparent reason. The
scope of various privileges and the conditions of waiver varied
with a similar lack of apparent reason. 3 Accordingly, the
Law Revision Commission sought to identify the policies underlying the various evidentiary rules and then to apply those
policies consistently to similar situations in order to avoid
the anomalies and inconsistencies that existed under prior
law. As the cases come before the reviewing courts, the
anomalies and inconsistencies have again begun to appear.
Indeed, as the California Supreme Court has started to imbed
the former limitations of· the hearsay rule into the Constitution, it has begun to make statements lauding the hearsay exceptions that the Commission and the prior commentators had
found so inconsistent and unsatisfactory. 4 Thus, for some
forms of hearsay (any hearsay admissible on a showing of
unavailability), we find that to guarantee the right of cross-
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"The use as substantive evidence
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examination, the courts exclude the evidence when, at trial,
cross-examination is provided and admit the evidence when it
is not provided. It is hoped that this development noted in the
cases this past year is not in fact a trend. It is also hoped
that the Court will not consider evidence rules constitutionally
sanctified merely because they are old. Too much reverence
for the evidence rules developed "over a long period of time
in countless decisions of English and American courts"5 would
merely stifle the reforms found to be so necessary.

s. People v. Washington, 71 Cal.2d
- , - , 80 Cal. Rptr. 567, 574-575, 458
P.2d 479, 486-487 (1969).
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